Colonel Maskhadov is still dead-2
I didn't intend to return to that theme, but
1) most of the analysts both in Russia and the West are promoting the usual 'he was the only hope for peace' meme that worked such brilliantly with Arafat, Hussein, and other 'legitimate secularist leaders', and
2) for some (probably technical) reasons, I was banned from commenting on Wind of Change article "The Death of Aslan Maskhadov" by Dan Darling, so I couldn't present some of the counterarguments there. Nothing to do but bore myself (as the sole reader of this startup blog) with the following:
The death of Maskhadov is almost the best thing for Chechnya. In some sense it is even better than the death of Basayev would be. Lots of Basayev-like jihadi are already dead. Hattab, Gelayev, Baraev, Abu al-Walid, Atgeriev, Raduev. Their death doesn't mean much, Arabs will send another leader. There are lots of jihadi wannabes and lots of Arabic funds and support for them.
But Maskhadov was an Arafat figure, a leader whose ability for fundraising and PR went beyond usual Islamist sources. He had influence in the West and was widely supported by British, American, and German NGOs and, to some extent, governments. He learned the art of speaking different things in different languages, making himself simultaneously the feared terrorist leader whose orders unleashed Dubrovka and Beslan massacres, and noble freedom fighter whose aspirations for peace process were trumped by ham-fisted Chechen-hating Russian KGB henchmen. Worse, he was relatively popular among purely nationalistic Chechens, those whose alliance to terrorist jihadi is contested with Chechenization.
The purpose of Chechenization is to separate legitimate insurgents from jihadi terrorists, and Maskhadov was the main obstacle. His talks about talks not only gave the air of legitimacy to terrorists, but also prevented real insurgents from making separate deals with Kadyrov's Chechens. Many of them made deals, and now are serving as police officers. But many others hesitated, hoping that Maskhadov will cut a better deal, and fearing his retribution. Now that hope is over and they are presented with their choice.
There are also talks about supposed 'revenge attacks'. We heard this after every successful killing of the terror leaders: Yasin, Rantisi, the aforementioned Hattab and company. However, this theory is fundamentally wrong in the presumption that jihadis usually lack the will to make terror. In fact, they have all the will to strike regardless of their enemy's actions, what they lack when they do not attack is means. And the death of a leader diminishes their means.
1) most of the analysts both in Russia and the West are promoting the usual 'he was the only hope for peace' meme that worked such brilliantly with Arafat, Hussein, and other 'legitimate secularist leaders', and
2) for some (probably technical) reasons, I was banned from commenting on Wind of Change article "The Death of Aslan Maskhadov" by Dan Darling, so I couldn't present some of the counterarguments there. Nothing to do but bore myself (as the sole reader of this startup blog) with the following:
The death of Maskhadov is almost the best thing for Chechnya. In some sense it is even better than the death of Basayev would be. Lots of Basayev-like jihadi are already dead. Hattab, Gelayev, Baraev, Abu al-Walid, Atgeriev, Raduev. Their death doesn't mean much, Arabs will send another leader. There are lots of jihadi wannabes and lots of Arabic funds and support for them.
But Maskhadov was an Arafat figure, a leader whose ability for fundraising and PR went beyond usual Islamist sources. He had influence in the West and was widely supported by British, American, and German NGOs and, to some extent, governments. He learned the art of speaking different things in different languages, making himself simultaneously the feared terrorist leader whose orders unleashed Dubrovka and Beslan massacres, and noble freedom fighter whose aspirations for peace process were trumped by ham-fisted Chechen-hating Russian KGB henchmen. Worse, he was relatively popular among purely nationalistic Chechens, those whose alliance to terrorist jihadi is contested with Chechenization.
The purpose of Chechenization is to separate legitimate insurgents from jihadi terrorists, and Maskhadov was the main obstacle. His talks about talks not only gave the air of legitimacy to terrorists, but also prevented real insurgents from making separate deals with Kadyrov's Chechens. Many of them made deals, and now are serving as police officers. But many others hesitated, hoping that Maskhadov will cut a better deal, and fearing his retribution. Now that hope is over and they are presented with their choice.
There are also talks about supposed 'revenge attacks'. We heard this after every successful killing of the terror leaders: Yasin, Rantisi, the aforementioned Hattab and company. However, this theory is fundamentally wrong in the presumption that jihadis usually lack the will to make terror. In fact, they have all the will to strike regardless of their enemy's actions, what they lack when they do not attack is means. And the death of a leader diminishes their means.
posted by Mike Tyukanov at 5:45 AM
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